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1. Introduction   
The object of this chapter is to examine the way in which competences are designed 
and delineated in EU law at the vertical level between the EU and the Member States 
and discuss their salient features. Over the years, EU competences have expanded, 
though not so meteorically as one may think. To alleviate concerns among Member 
States about the impact of EU competence enlargement upon national legal systems, a 
number of principles were designed to limit the powers of the EU.2 Having said that, 
there is hardly today an area of regulation that the EU does not play an active part – 
from trade and energy to sport and fundamental rights protection.  
Τhe gradual expansion of EU competence is visible in the insertion of specific legal 
bases as a result of the periodic Treaty revisions and architectural alterations that the 
EU has undergone. These vary from the Union’s de-pillarisation and the attribution of 
the same legal value as the EU Treaties to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
Charter). The Treaties’ enrichment with new legal bases has also had a profound 
effect upon the character of EU legislation which is increasingly occupying more 
areas of national regulation. EU legislation is not only conferring a range of rights to 
the individual; it also provides for robust supervision, new liability norms, 
enforcement and sanctions (sometimes criminal in nature) against EU law breaches.  
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The contribution of all Member States, both individually and collectively, to the 
expansion of EU competence forms a central component to the debate. 
Correspondingly, the design of EU competences reflects the Member States’ power 
balances at the time of each Treaty change. As such, the development of EU 
competences constitutes the political by-product of Member States investing in the 
benefits they can accrue from acting collectively. Henceforth, national law can no 
more be fully comprehended without knowledge of the degree of the sovereign states’ 
obligations under EU law.  
There has been almost a parallel development cycle. The Member States’ choice to 
transfer more of their competences to the EU has coincided with increasing political 
discontent in some quarters about the extent of attribution of competences across a 
number of policy fields such as immigration and employment and social policy. When 
disputes arise, the CJEU’s case law has only given effect to the imperatives achieved 
collectively by the Member States. It has also habitually expanded, through its 
teleological interpretation, the scope of EU law and thus the law-making competence 
of the EU. There are times where such an expansion has occurred softly due to the 
CJEU’s reluctance to exercise a robust judicial review of EU contested measures. 
There are also instances where the CJEU has been more vigorous in effectuating the 
objectives that Member States have agreed in the text of the Treaty while abandoning 
national constitutional concerns. 
This chapter serves to provide a tour de horizon of the nature and scope of EU 
competences.3  It argues that despite its imperfections the current dispensation of 
competence delimitation in the Treaty is pitched at the appropriate level but is 
nonetheless in need of a more objective system of judicial review. The chapter intends 
to provide the reader with a panoramic, updated and coherent account on the current 
typology and nature of EU competences. It serves to reach out to an audience groping 
for knowledge of the incremental regulatory presence of the EU and the grey areas of 
EU competence delimitation. It is ultimately hoped that the chapter will provide a 
treatise of current complications pertinent to EU competences and enable the reader to 
crystal-gaze into palatable solutions about their future delimitation.  
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2. Express Provisions Defining EU Competences  
The division of competences in the EU has generated considerable scholarship during 
the past ten years or so. 4  The inclusion in the Treaty of specific provisions on 
competence provided signposts for the EU and national legislatures, as well as the EU 
and national courts. By extension, individual citizen rights were either acquired or 
affected as a result of EU law. Substantively, the Treaty was gradually enriched with 
a host of leges speciales which have enabled EU Institutions to abstain from resorting 
regularly to implied powers in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. It is the 
insertion of new express competence provisions in the Treaty that this section 
examines.  
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, competences were virtually divided into subject-related 
and objective-related competences. These categories drew their titles from their 
subject-matter (exclusive, shared and complementary competences) or their objective 
(the provisions of current Articles 114 and 352 TFEU). As regards subject-related 
competences, it was clear, pre-Lisbon, that any action taken by the EU must have a 
legal basis either in the Treaty or in secondary legislation. Whilst certain Treaty 
provisions addressed the extent of that power, there was no express substantive 
division of powers in the Treaties.  
The Lisbon Treaty resolved the above competence semantics issue by providing a 
formal catalogue of competences to designate the sectors where compromises 
between the EU and national decision-makers should be drawn. The Lisbon taxonomy 
of competences was further augmented by the insertion of new substantive 
competences in the area of healthcare, criminal justice, immigration, energy, social 
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policy and economic coordination to mention but a few areas. It is also worth stating 
that the Lisbon Treaty laid down in Article 4 (2) TEU an updated commitment from 
the part of the EU to ‘respect the national identities of Member States, inherent in 
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’. The scope of application of 
national identity has given rise to a set of intricate issues related to the preservation of 
national sovereignty that has been examined elsewhere. 5  
Overall, the wording of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to competences did not pledge 
for a radical transformation of the old system of competence delimitation. The new 
competence provisions provide an overview or checklist of the EU’s spheres of 
activity. They do not establish a systematic description of the legal effects of EU 
powers with reference to national competence.6 The Lisbon competence taxonomy is 
only intended to provide general guidance as to the scope of issues over which the EU 
has powers to take action. It is not designed to set EU competences in stone by 
exhaustively detailing the conduct of the EU Institutions in every single area of EU 
activity.  
Having said that, the main position remains that every action at the EU level needs to 
be grounded on a clear legal basis stemming from the Treaties. This is particularly 
important in the field of EU foreign policy, since the areas of express internal 
competence also prescribe the potential for EU external action. EU’s action on the 
international scene is amplified by the Treaty in the form of express provisions 
regarding its legal personality (Article 47 TEU), the capacity to negotiate agreements 
with third countries or international organisations (Article 218 TFEU), and the 
possibility to pursue common policies and actions to safeguard EU values, 
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fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity (Article 21 (a) TEU). The 
conclusion of international agreements is unproblematic in most cases. The EU 
legislature has to find an express power in the Treaties that authorises the EU to do so. 
There are cases, however, that raise concern as EU external powers may emerge from 
Treaty legal bases allowing for internal action and from measures adopted within the 
framework of these provisions.7  
Thus, the EU can resort to internal legal bases in order to pursue international 
cooperation in a range of areas not stipulated by the Treaty. Most notably, in the 
absence of any such express powers in the Treaty, the CJEU has provided in the past 
that the EU may still be ‘impliedly’ competent to enter into international agreements. 
The powers of the EU to impliedly conclude international agreements under the post-
Lisbon dispensation are now listed in Article 216 (1) TFEU, examined later in this 
chapter. Yet, before dissecting into EU competences by subject area, it is apt to focus 
on their typology, which in turn determines the course of action of the EU and its 
Member States vis-à-vis the proverbial pie-sharing of authority and assigned 
responsibilities. 
2.1 Getting to grips with the Lisbon typology 
The Lisbon Treaty provides for a competence categorisation which resembles the ill-
fated EU Constitutional Treaty (ECT) aborted almost ten years ago. In the ECT, Part I 
– Title III, entitled ‘Union Competences’ specified the three categories of Union’s 
competences (exclusive, shared and supporting) and asserted for each given category 
the consequences of the EU’s exercise of its competences for the Member States. 
Similarly, in the Lisbon Treaty, Title I, entitled ‘Categories and Areas of the Union’s 
Competence’, sets out the different categories of EU competence and describes the 
legislative and implementing roles of the EU and the Member States. Article 2 TFEU 
provides a broad categorisation of defined powers while Articles 3, 4 and 6 TFEU 
distinguish between exclusive, shared and supporting competences.  
The provisions on the different policy fields, as well as the specifications for each 
legal basis addressed in Article 2 TFEU, stipulate that supranational competences 
shall be exercised according to the Treaty provisions relating to each area. This 
                                                          
7 See Chapter 36 of this volume. 
6 
reference covers both competences, and the form of legal acts provided for in those 
provisions. Moreover, Article 296 TFEU is significant in relation to the allocation of 
EU competences – it stipulates that ‘where the Treaties do not specify the type of act 
to be adopted, the institutions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in compliance 
with the applicable procedures and with the principle of proportionality’. It also 
imposes a duty upon the EU legislature to give reasons in relation to all legal acts, 
regardless of their nature as legislative, delegated or implementing acts. 
Outside of exclusive, shared and supporting competences, the Lisbon Treaty 
maintains a separate category of competences. This category can be perceived as an 
anomaly as it lists competences which do not fit squarely into the above tripartite 
classification and are not assigned to a particular group. These are the politically 
sensitive areas of coordination of economic and employment policies of the Member 
States mutually reinforcing each other (Articles 5 TFEU), and the CFSP (Articles 24 
TFEU). The sui generis nature of competences in this category does not preclude the 
application of the principles of sincere cooperation and primacy of EU law, although 
the CFSP is still the only policy area that is regulated by the TEU.8 
2.2 Exclusive Competence 
Within the sphere of exclusive competence, only the EU may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts. As Craig noted when the ECT first introduced an express 
competence typology, this is why ‘the domain of exclusive competence comes out 
reasonably in terms of clarity.’9 Apart from a few borderline issues, under the Lisbon 
Treaty the EU enjoys exclusive competence in a handful of sectors where it is solely 
responsible for legislating. That is to say that under Article 3 (1) TFEU, Member 
States are barred from enacting legislation on customs, internal market related 
competition rules, monetary policy, external trade and fisheries. In the absence of 
supranational measures, Member States have to be purposely authorised by the EU to 
adopt measures in any of these categories, inclusive of measures to assist with the 
implementation of acts adopted by the EU.  
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Although generally straightforward to apply, exclusive competences can take 
different forms. Hence, for clarification we will use a subjective categorisation 
dividing exclusivity into: a priori exclusivity as expressed in Article 3 (1) TFEU; the 
questionable implied exclusivity resulting from market harmonisation legislation; and 
derived exclusivity in the context of the EU’s conclusion of international agreements 
as expressed in Article 3 (2) TFEU. 
The areas that fall under the a priori exclusive effect of EU law are limited in extent 
and have been historically developed through a combination of Treaty revisions (for 
instance in the area of the European Monetary Union); secondary legislation (most 
notably in the area of Common Fisheries Policy) and the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
(particularly in the field of external powers to sign international agreements) - all of 
which have been duly codified in the Lisbon Treaty. 10 Article 3 (1) TFEU provides a 
list of the EU’s exclusive competences inclusive of the customs union, competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, monetary policy and 
Common Commercial Policy (hereafter, CCP), to name but a few areas. Within these 
areas of exclusive activity, EU Institutions are legally capable of acting 
independently, therefore precluding any national action. Such a strict dividing line 
between exclusive and shared competences was historically absent from the Treaty. 
All competences in the Treaty of Rome, except perhaps from the CCP, appeared to be 
shared between the former Community and the Member States.  
Textually, the concept of exclusive competence appeared for the first time in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, Article 3b (the current Article 5 TEU) that contains the 
principles of conferral or attribution of powers, subsidiarity and proportionality. This 
provision still expressly excludes the application of the principle of subsidiarity in 
areas ‘which do not fall within the exclusive competence’ of the EU [emphasis 
added]. This limitation upon the principle of subsidiarity relieved the EU legislative 
Institutions from the practical obligation of proving, in accordance with the 
subsidiarity test, that EU action is necessary in order to attain the objectives of the 
Treaty. The Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
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proportionality introduced later by the Treaty of Amsterdam, contained a further 
reference to the notion of exclusivity.11 
Hence, action by the Member States in a field of exclusive competence is only 
possible where the EU has been explicitly empowered to act. Having said that, the EU 
has not recently introduced any new exclusive competences. In Pringle, the CJEU 
held against the claimant’s argument that the European Stability Mechanism (the 
ESM, hereafter) established by Decision 2011/199 with the aim to amend Article 136 
(3) TFEU, encroached upon the exclusive competence held by the EU. It approved the 
ESM as an economic policy measure under Articles 2 (3) and 5 (1) TFEU 
(coordination of Member States’ economic policies) because it had repercussions on 
the stability of the Euro currency. Last, it was emphasised that Article 136 (3) TFEU 
only confirmed the Member States’ competence to establish a stability mechanism. It 
did not open the door to a novel EU exclusive competence although the dividing line 
between monetary and economic policy remains very thin and elastic.12 
This discussion leads us to enquire what happens in cases of EU inactivity – i.e. when 
the EU legislative Institutions have not yet exercised an exclusive competence 
prescribed by the Treaty. In these circumstances, a Member State is not precluded 
from legislating, but its right to do so would be subject to acting as a ‘trustee of the 
EU interest’ by adopting measures necessary to the achievement of a supranational 
aim. This term was coined a while ago by the CJEU in Commission v UK in respect of 
the Common Fisheries Policy.13 The idea is that the objective of implied authorisation 
for national legislation in areas of EU exclusive competence should have an 
equivalent outcome to EU legislation, namely promoting the ‘common interest’. 
Practically, this attitude represents a way of remedying the legal vacuum arising when 
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the EU has not addressed promptly national regulatory needs. Symbolically, however, 
it can be described as a departure from the traditional notion of exclusivity. 
Another textual departure from the Treaty concerns the alleged exclusivity resulting 
out of internal market harmonisation – what we may confidently refer to as an 
artificial type of exclusivity. In 1992, the Commission emphasised the link between 
exclusive competence and the imperatives of free movement and the internal market, 
which now comprises a field of shared competence.14 The Commission’s objective-
based approach to EU competences, which is somewhat prominent to this day, 
exposed a problem pertaining to the categorisation of competences in EU law. This 
problem was eventually clarified (insofar as Article 114 TFEU is concerned) by the 
CJEU where it held that the EU’s competence under Article 114 TFEU is not 
exclusive (and hence it is subject to the subsidiarity principle).15 Yet, a brief study of 
the current formulation of Article 114 TFEU is sufficient to prove that such 
demarcation lines are still blurred as a result of EU competences often exercised by 
the objectives which they serve as opposed to their subject matter.16   
The use of Article 114 TFEU, discussed in more detail below in the context of shared 
competence, forms an example of an otherwise shared power becoming exclusive in 
effect once exercised. 17 The provision, aimed at eliminating trade barriers and 
competition distortions, has in recent years become a wide competence which has 
been utilised by the EU in order to regulate areas of national activity sometimes 
loosely connected with the internal market (e.g. crime prevention through data 
retention and money laundering).18 In the same direction, the relevant case law of the 
CJEU concerning challenges against harmonisation measures adopted under Article 
114 TFEU reveals that the EU legislature is allowed a broad margin of discretion to 
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regulate the socio-economic and political choices of Member States.19  This is perhaps 
because the exercise of national regulatory autonomy often carries the potential of 
causing a disparity or distortion to the internal market - i.e. the main obstacle that 
Article 114 TFEU was created to overcome. When this occurs, EU action takes place 
to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
(broadly construed) by producing exclusive results.  
Having said that, there are instances where Article 114 TFEU has engaged in direct 
conflict with another legal basis related to an area falling under EU exclusive 
competences. Such conflict has been observed in two cases concerning the distinction 
between the CCP, which relates to trade with non-Member States (an exclusive 
competence), and trade in the internal market (a shared competence). In both cases, 
the CJEU decided to give prevalence to its exclusive competence over the shared one. 
The first case concerned an inter-institutional dispute over the use of the correct legal 
basis on the authorisation of the signing of an international agreement on audiovisual 
services by an EU Decision (2011/853). Anticipating a competence slippery slope, the 
CJEU held that such an agreement should have been concluded under the relevant 
CCP legal basis of Article 207 TFEU (exclusive competence) and not the internal 
market provision of Article 114 TFEU (shared competence).20  
Subsequently, the CJEU resorted to the same argument in Daiichi where it decided 
that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) falls 
within the CCP exclusive competence of the EU.21 The message that these two cases 
carry with respect to EU external action is that the EU legislature shall take stock of 
the objective of the relevant agreement altogether and not that of the specific 
provision used. No doubt, the above decisions will affect the future division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States in the conclusion of 
international agreements with third parties. What is more, the CJEU seems to have 
stopped Article 114 TFEU from achieving EU objectives that squarely fall under its 
realm of EU exclusive competences. 
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As illustrated above, the interplay between internal and external powers elucidates the 
competence issues relevant to the conclusion of international treaties. Beyond the 
specific subject area of CCP, the Treaty provides that certain international agreements 
may fall into the category of exclusive competence. This category is not rigid but 
open for development. Article 3 (2) TFEU takes stock of the CJEU’s established case 
law which has highlighted that the EU can enter into international agreements both by 
virtue of express conferment and by relying on other Treaty provisions and measures 
adopted by the EU legislature in the framework of those provisions. Once exercised, 
such power can become exclusive.22  
Like a number of competence provisions found written in the Treaty, Article 3 (2) 
TFEU illustrates an attempt to codify the CJEU’s established jurisprudence on 
derived exclusivity.23 The term derived is used here to distinguish such a type of 
exclusivity from the previously-mentioned a priori exclusivity enshrined in Article 3 
(1) TFEU. According to Article 3 (2) TFEU, derived exclusivity emerges where EU 
competence is provided for in a legislative act of the EU; it is necessary to enable the 
EU to exercise its internal competence; and insofar as its conclusion may affect 
common rules or alter their scope. The CJEU has, therefore, derived rules establishing 
that EU competence to conclude international agreements is exclusive even in fields 
where competence is shared with the Member States. For instance, the CJEU 
confirmed recently in Opinion 1/13, in relation to the issue of accepting the accession 
of a non-Member State to the 1980 Hague Convention on child abduction, that EU 
external competence ‘may [also] be exercised through the intermediary of the 
Member States acting in the EU’s interest.’24 This case illustrates that the CJEU’s 
interpretation of derived exclusivity is excessive because it gives the EU authority to 
prescribe the code of conduct of international agreements concluded by the Member 
States in the field of private international law. 
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23 See below, Section 3.2. 
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2.3 Shared Competence 
Shared competence between the EU and the Member States is the default position in 
EU law, meaning that the majority of the EU’s powers lie in this sphere. Both the EU 
and Member States may legislate, but once the EU has adopted an act, the Member 
States lose their competence. In this category, Member States are only competent to 
exercise their powers insofar as: the EU has not yet exercised its competences, or to 
the extent that the EU has stopped exercising its competence. Article 4 (2) TFEU 
provides that the EU has shared competence in a number of specific fields such as the 
Environment and Energy, and in broader fields such as the internal market or the so-
called Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The latter field is broken down 
into specialised areas such as asylum law and cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters.  
Each of the fields of shared competence is governed by different rules. This can be 
challenging because the expansion of EU shared competence has spawned 
considerable policy fusion. For instance, the overlap between the internal market and 
AFSJ competences has become flagrant since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Such a policy overlap owes much to the shared features between, for instance, 
EU internal market regulation (e.g. relating to transport and road safety) and the 
cooperation of law enforcement bodies on offences covered by the Treaty (Article 87 
TFEU).25 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, shared competence involved primarily the internal market 
and the AFSJ (with the exception of criminal law) whilst it was subject to debate 
whether social policy, environmental policy, consumer protection, some aspects of 
public health, transport policy and agricultural policy constituted shared or 
complementary competences. This uncertainty cohered with the softer impact of EU 
competence upon national regulatory activity in these areas. The degree of EU 
harmonisation allowed in general was and still is to a great extent determined by the 
relevant legal bases that determine the extent of EU action in specific aspects of 
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policy areas. For practical reasons, we can resort to the Von Bogdandy and Bast 
classification of shared powers as either concurrent or parallel.26 
On the one hand, the internal market can be labelled as a concurrent power since 
Member States have very little room for the exercise of their own powers. On the 
other hand, the express caveat in the use of the EU’s new energy competence forms a 
good example of parallelism. Although both the EU and the Member States can act in 
the field of energy, Article 194 (2) TFEU, reduces the pre-emptive effect of EU 
legislation in the field by confirming that that the adoption of measures which ‘affect 
a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, 
its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply’ is prohibited.27 Hence, the degree of pre-emption in EU shared competence is 
contingent upon, inter alia, the limits set by the Treaty. 
These examples demonstrate that the precise amount of power conferred upon the EU 
differs substantially between areas. They also reveal a great deal about the powers 
vested in the Member States. Certain Treaty provisions on shared competence consist 
of a virtually complete regulatory code, severely restricting or pre-empting national 
freedom of manoeuvre. Conversely, other Treaty provisions on shared competence 
establish a partial regulatory code, therefore not resulting in a uniform legislative 
regime. In both cases, in the absence of EU harmonisation legislation (i.e. for as long 
as the EU legislature has not yet exercised its competence), Member States enjoy the 
freedom to legislate and maintain independent regulatory strategies. This is true even 
after the EU has exercised its competence insofar as the Member States respect their 
obligations under EU secondary legislation which may only provide for minimum 
harmonisation or are justified in doing so by an express Treaty derogation or an 
(unwritten) imperative requirement - policy consideration.28  
Yet, Member States have more often than not been astounded at how the exercise of 
their regulatory freedom is reduced with the passage of time and how their actions 
                                                          
26 A. Von Bogdandy A and J. Bast, ‘The Vertical Order of Competences’ (2002) 39 Common Market 
Law Review 227. 
27 K. Haraldsdottir, ‘The limits of EU competence to regulate conditions for exploitation of energy 
resources: analysis of article 194 (2) TFEU’ (2014) 23 (6) European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review 208.  
28 See Case C–213/07 Michaniki AE [2008] ECR I–9999; Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] 
ECR I-9609. 
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may impinge upon EU law when they act loosely within its scope. Luxembourg 
judges have availed of the opportunity to use the EU law toolset to bring national 
action within the scope of EU law in most cases appearing before them.29 First, the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence on free movement provisions provides numerous examples of 
Treaty obligations in relation to measures adopted by Member States that can affect 
the internal market, which implicitly creates potential hindrances to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms under the Treaty. For instance, in the area of the free 
movement of goods, the ‘market access test’ stipulates that any national measure 
adopted by a Member State, which hinders market access for products manufactured 
in another Member State, constitutes a measure equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction. This is regardless of whether or not such a national measure was designed 
to discriminate.30 Second, the CJEU has emphasised the Member States’ duty of loyal 
cooperation - i.e. if the situation is covered by the material scope of EU law, Member 
States ought to exercise their competences in accordance with EU law.31  
It arises from the above examples that most fields that bestow the EU and its Member 
States with a shared competence provide that Member States shall be pre-empted by 
the EU legislative Institutions’ exercise of power or by due regard to the scope of 
application of EU law. The preclusion of national regulatory powers by the CJEU 
reinforces the effect of Weiler’s notion of normative supranationality by adding next 
to the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law the notion of implied pre-
emption.32 As such, vast areas such as the internal market, although ‘shared’ textually 
are difficult to pin down as such because they have been heavily populated by EU 
legislation. As previously illustrated, the above developments raise concern about 
how ‘shared’ these areas actually are.  
                                                          
29 See on the interpretative approach of the CJEU: G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the 
European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2012); G. Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
30 This formula is manifest in the CJEU’s post Keck case law (Case C-267/91 & C-268/91 Keck [1993] 
ECR-I 6097). See more recently: AG Bot Opinion in Case C‐333/14 The Scotch Whisky Association 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:527, para 58 onwards.   
31 See for instance: C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR 1-4239; Opinion of A.G. Maduro in C-135/08 
Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449; C-446/03 Marks & Spencer Plc [2005] ECR I-10837; C-148/02 Garcia 
Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; C-192/05 Tas Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451. See also on the duty of sincere 
cooperation: G. De Baere and T. Roes, ‘EU loyalty as good faith’ (2015) 64 (4) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 829. 
32 See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European 
Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the 
European Communities’ (1986) Washington Law Review 1103.  
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In the EU’s defence, the model of a fully integrated and deregulated market agreed by 
the Member States demands that EU initiatives override national trade and economic 
measures. At the same time, we should not overlook the fact that Member States have 
also reserved areas where EU legislation may entail minimum harmonisation leaving 
them therefore a margin for action in a specific field that the EU has exercised its 
competences.  
EU consumer law comprises a good example where, following harmonisation (e.g. 
Directive 98/6/EC on the indication of prices of products offered to consumers),33 
Member States can still adopt or retain rules which match or which are more 
favourable to consumers, exceeding the minimum standard demanded by a Directive. 
Yet, even in these areas the EU has moved forward in promoting a culture of full 
harmonisation of some key regulatory aspects in order to increase legal certainty for 
both consumers and businesses, eliminating the barriers stemming from the 
fragmentation of current rules, and therefore completing the internal market in this 
area. This approach was evident with the passage of the 2005 Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (2005/29), the 2008 Timeshare Directive (2008/112) and most 
recently the 2014 EU Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EC) which introduces a 
new collective actions regime.34 
The above study leaves us with practically one situation that falls squarely outside the 
entire typology of EU competences where Member States will enjoy absolute freedom 
to exercise their competence. This is possible in the rare occurrence that the EU 
ceases to exercise its competence by, for instance, repealing a legislative act without 
replacing it. This is what happened in the context of shared competences with the 
Data Retention Directive which came into force in 2006.35 In the UK, a statutory 
instrument (hereafter, DRIPA) was introduced in 2009 to transpose the Directive 
(adopted under Article 114 TFEU) into domestic law. In April 2014, the CJEU ruled 
in favour of Digital Rights Ireland (DRI) and annulled the Directive on the basis of its 
                                                          
33 Directive 98/6 [1998] OJ L 166/51. 
34  Directive 2005/29 [2005] OJ L 149/ 22; Directive 2008/112 [2008] OJ L 345/68; Directive 
2011/83/EC [2011] OJ L 304/64. 
35 Directive 2006/24 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks [2006] 
OJL 105/54. 
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violation of Articles 7 and 8 ECHR.36  By July 2014 the DRIPA received Royal 
Assent, although it was successfully challenged on similar grounds in the High Court 
by MPs David Davis and Tom Watson.37  In the absence of new Data Retention 
legislation, a new draft Investigatory Powers Bill, replacing DRIPA, was announced 
on 4 November 2015 and went in force on 30 December 2016.38 While the data 
retention saga represents a good example of a shared competence returning back to 
the Member States, it also illustrates that the repatriation of national competences can 
create esoteric constitutional problems that have to be addressed in litigation before 
national courts.  
2.3.1 Recourse to Article 114 TFEU 
As discussed previously, in tandem with the trend of exclusivity through pre-emption, 
the regulatory autonomy of Member States in the field of shared competences has 
been curtailed by the liberal use of Article 114 TFEU. This trend marks a trajectory 
from a ‘subject’ to an ‘objective’ driven approach to shared competence at the EU 
level. In this respect, it has been argued that Article 114 TFEU constitutes ‘the central 
legal basis to resolve Europe’s institutional and regulatory shortcomings.’39  
A legislative act under Article 114 TFEU must fulfil two conditions: it must 
approximate national measures and it must have as its object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. We should also note that Article 114 TFEU 
constitutes a lex generalis and, as such, it may give way to a lex specialis when 
available. To use the example of energy policy again, prior to the insertion of Article 
194 TFEU (which ensures that Member States can diversify their energy supplies and 
improve competitiveness), the EU could take action for the functioning of the energy 
market through resort to Article 114 TFEU. In these circumstances, Article 114 TFEU 
was used to protect the consumer where existing disparities in national product safety 
rules hindered the functioning of the internal market, leading to unequal competition. 
                                                          
36  Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland & Seitlinger [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
37 [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin). 
38Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigat
ory_Powers_Bill.pdf [last accessed on 15.12.2015]. 
39 E. Fahey, ‘Does the Emperor have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the Legal Basis of the 
European Banking Authority’ (2011) 74 (4) Modern Law Review 581. 
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Post-Lisbon, the lex specialis of Article 194 TFEU has made resort to the lex generals 
of Article 114 TFEU redundant in this policy sector. 
What is more, with regard to the limits of Article 114 TFEU, there are a number of 
specificities in relation to its application that provide Member States with a certain 
latitude to retain their regulatory autonomy. For instance, Member States can maintain 
a high level of protection in relation to health and safety, the environment and 
consumer protection. 40  This includes introducing national rules in case specific 
problems emerge after EU harmonisation. There, the Commission would decide 
whether a measure is excluding, discriminatory, a hidden trade restriction or an 
obstruction to the functioning of the internal market and would notify the Member 
States. Once a national derogation from harmonisation is approved, the Commission 
would propose adaptation of the measure in question. The Commission or a Member 
State may also bring a matter before the CJEU if another Member State makes 
improper use of its derogatory powers provided in Article 114 TFEU. Finally, a 
safeguard clause may authorise Member States to adopt provisional measures subject 
to EU control. 
Despite the above exceptions, the prevailing perception is that Article 114 TFEU may 
still be employed by EU Institutions as a vehicle towards forcing legislation upon 
Member States.41 The identification by the EU legislature of a link (however tenuous) 
between the object of legislation and the internal market appears to be sufficient.42 In 
this respect, Article 114 TFEU still serves the same objective as its predecessor 
Article 100a EC (renumbered to Article 95 EC in Maastricht) introduced by the 
Single European Act back in 1987: this is to accelerate the accomplishment of the 
internal market. Having a harmonisation provision in place under which the Council 
can operate under qualified majority has proved to be a particularly useful means to 
approximate areas where the EU legislature notices disparities between national rules 
obstructing the EU’s fundamental freedoms. Such rules were taken to have a negative 
effect on the functioning of the internal market or caused appreciable distortions of 
                                                          
40 Public health is not included in the so-called environmental guarantee inherent in Article 114 TFEU. 
41 Joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P Land Oberösterreich & Austria v Commission [2005] ECR 
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42 See for analysis on the tenuous internal market link of legislation adopted under Art.114 TFEU: T. 
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competition. As a result, the EU has employed Article 114 TFEU in order to 
substitute national provisions / market obstacles by adopting appropriate measures. 
Indeed, it has been some time since the CJEU engaged with the constitutional 
orthodoxy of Tobacco Advertising I,43 a judgment celebrated for its compliance with 
the fundamental principle of conferral of powers.44 Against the literal interpretation of 
the Treaty in this judgment, the CJEU hardly questioned in subsequent cases whether 
or not the object of measures adopted by the EU legislature under Article 114 TFEU 
genuinely improved the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. It rather upheld the general competence of the EU legislature to 
regulate the internal market. There is very little in the post-Tobacco Advertising 
jurisprudence of the CJEU which suggests that either the EU legislature or the 
judiciary will exercise a degree of self-restraint as part of a wider effort to set clear 
limits to EU market dominance.45 
As illustrated in more recent cases, the mere finding of disparities between national 
laws and abstract risks to free movement are not only sufficient to justify recourse to 
Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis but, additionally (and most surprisingly perhaps 
from a rule of law perspective), do not raise an issue of legality. This is because the 
breadth of the internal market is so wide that it makes it almost impossible to 
contemplate any area of national competence that will not be affected by a 
supranational measure genuinely aimed at the improvement of the conditions of the 
functioning of the internal market (from roaming to money laundering).  
It is established in the case law, for example, that even future divergences in the laws 
of the Member States may justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU provided that they are 
reasonably likely to occur. Hence, by resorting to Article 114 TFEU, the EU 
legislature arguably stays within its margins of competence since any contested 
measure will almost always be considered necessary for the proper operation of the 
internal market. It follows that the utilisation of Article 114 TFEU has inevitable side 
                                                          
43 Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR 1-8419. 
44 S. Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising’ 
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effects upon national sovereignty, of which the Ministers in the Council are fully 
aware.  
Notwithstanding the above procrustean approach to EU competence, in recent years 
the EU legislature has employed Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis to set up agencies 
that contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market, even when their 
powers are essentially non-regulatory in nature. In UK v European Parliament and 
Council, the UK unsuccessfully challenged Regulation 460/2004 establishing the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) on the ground that 
Article 114 TFEU did not provide an appropriate legal basis for its adoption.46 The 
British argument was based on the nature of the power conferred on the EU 
legislature under Article 114 TFEU, which is limited in the adoption of harmonisation 
measures addressed to individual Member States. The UK dismissed the contention 
that Article 114 TFEU can be utilised by the EU legislature to establish EU bodies 
and confer tasks upon them. The CJEU disagreed and confirmed the legality of 
ENISA arguing that the term ‘measures for the approximation’ written in Article 114 
TFEU confers on EU legislature considerable discretion as regards the method of 
approximation for achieving the desired result.  
All in all, the CJEU confirmed that there is nothing in the wording of Article 114 
TFEU which suggests that the addressees of the measures adopted by the EU 
legislature have to solely be Member States. Article 114 TFEU may also be an 
appropriate legal basis for measures that are legally binding on individuals in order to 
preserve the unity of the internal market. This configuration was also confirmed in a 
more recent challenge.47 In line with its previous decision in ENISA, the CJEU held 
that Article 114 TFEU supplies an appropriate legal basis for the European Securities 
and Markets Authority’s (ESMA) powers to adopt emergency measures on the 
financial markets of the Member States in order to regulate or prohibit short selling. 
The CJEU concluded that the Regulation in question (No 236/2012), which vests the 
ESMA with powers of intervention, was directed at the harmonisation of the Member 
States’ laws, regulations and administrative provisions. Its purpose was, therefore, to 
                                                          
46 Case C-217/ 04 UK v Parliament and Council (ENISA) [2006] ECRI-3771. 
47 Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament and Council (ESMA). The case has been criticised for going 
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improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in 
the financial field.48 
The CJEU’s judgments on agencies do not follow an economic analysis in identifying 
whether differences in the laws of the Member States cause direct obstacles to trade. 
Other cases also lead to the same conclusion. A good example can be drawn from the 
UK’s unsuccessful challenge against Regulation 2065/2003, aimed to set up a pan-
European procedure for the authorisation of smoke flavourings for food.49 The CJEU 
stressed that it was apparent that the purpose of the Regulation was to improve the 
conditions for the establishment of the internal market, especially since the 
evaluations relating to the safety of food products corresponds to the Article 114 (3) 
TFEU objective of ensuring a high level of health protection as well as the legal 
principles enshrined in the Treaty and the CJEU's established case law. 
The CJEU’s case law has been somewhat inconsistent on setting clear boundaries 
with regard to Article 114 TFEU as a general legislative power for the EU. For 
instance while the Luxembourg judges took a corrective approach viz. an orthodox 
use of Article 114 TFEU in the PNR case,50 they abstained from doing so in Ireland v 
Council 51  and in DRI, addressed above. The former case challenged the EU 
legislature’s recourse to Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the adoption of the 
Data Retention Directive (violation of the principle of conferral) whilst the latter case 
concerned the Directive’s compatibility with the right to privacy enshrined in the 
ECHR. While the CJEU dismissed Ireland’s conferral arguments in the first case, it 
upheld the DRI’s human rights allegations in the latter.  
The challenges before the CJEU against the respective legislation adopted under 
Article 114 TFEU make us none the wiser as regards the exercise of EU shared 
competence in areas such as the internal market and the AFSJ. Worse than that, as 
seen, they fail to restraint the use of Article 114 TFEU in the field of criminal law that 
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European Law Review 812. 
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the Treaty provides a clear legal basis under Article 83 TFEU for the adoption of 
relevant measures. With regard to surveillance, the CJEU has acquiesced to the will of 
the EU legislature (and the national governments who pushed for more surveillance 
legislation at the EU level after the 2005 terrorist attacks in London) and appears to 
have authorised the use of Article 114 TFEU insofar as there are some procedural 
guarantees inserted in the legislative measure in question. Even if the European 
Commission does not plan to present a new legislative initiative on data retention, 
there is nothing in the CJEU’s previous judgments that prevents recourse to Article 
114 TFEU as a legal basis for a future Directive on electronic surveillance in the 
investigation of serious crime.  
2.4 Supporting Competence 
Supporting or complementary competence found in Article 6 TFEU covers a handful 
of areas where EU action is supplementary to the action of the Member States. EU 
and national competences co-exist on the same plane and are exercised in parallel. 
When the EU exercises a supporting competence by adopting legally binding acts, 
Member States are not blocked from regulating the given field, as when the area in 
question falls under shared competence. In contrast, national autonomous action is 
allowed and the EU may only ‘complement’ such an action and ‘contribute’ to 
achieve the common objectives set out in the Treaty without being allowed to adopt 
harmonisation rules. This stands true as long as the EU measures enacted support 
national ones. However, once EU acts are adopted, they are binding upon the Member 
States and partly supersede the field they cover. In the event of conflict, therefore, the 
principle of primacy of EU law would apply as a coordinating norm. 
To use an example, a popular area of EU supporting competences pertains to the 
protection and improvement of public health (the first area of supporting competence 
listed in Article 6 (a) TFEU). The EU has enjoyed competence in the area of health 
since the introduction of Article 129 EC (now Article 168 TFEU) by the Maastricht 
Treaty which expressly excluded ‘any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States’.52 This is still reflected in the current Article 168 (5) TFEU which 
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renews this commitment by granting a limited competence to the EU to promote 
cooperation in relation to health policy by adopting incentive measures using the co-
decision procedure. Post-Lisbon incentive measures include aspects such as cross-
border threats to health regarding alcohol and tobacco. On the face of it, such 
competence appears corrective to the post Tobacco Advertising precedent - the EU 
Institutions may adopt incentive measures instead of harmonisation Directives under 
Article 114 TFEU in order to help Member States adopt a tobacco control strategy 
designed to protect the public from tobacco promotion. 
Yet, there are considerable overlaps and dividing line issues between the category of 
supporting competence and that of shared competence. For instance, the fact that 
under Article 168 TFEU the EU may only support national action by passing 
incentive measures does not exclude the adoption of harmonising measures aimed at 
the protection of human health. Such measures can be passed indirectly under a legal 
basis that falls under the shared competence category (as listed in Article 4 TFEU). 
For instance, Article 191 (2) TFEU, enabling environmental legislation, may be 
employed to achieve a health objective (e.g. improvement of air and water quality) as 
long as this is compatible with the core aim of the measure (e.g. to protect the 
environment). A similar result may also be achieved by EU harmonisation measures 
adopted under Article 114 TFEU, as was the case with the Tobacco Advertising saga, 
facilitating measures for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. As 
the CJEU’s established case law confirms, insofar as a measure is considered 
necessary for the completion and proper operation of the internal market, its 
implications for national health policy may not raise an issue as regards EU legal 
competence. 
It can therefore be concluded with a degree of certainty that in cases where an EU 
harmonising measure serves an internal market aim as well as pursuing health 
objectives, the CJEU will consider the measure as being adopted within the legitimate 
contours of Article 114 TFEU, as opposed to Article 191 TFEU.53 Whether the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                      
have been based on [Article 114 TFEU].’ R. Schütze, ‘Cooperative federalism constitutionalised: the 
emergence of complementary competences in the EC legal order’ (2006) 31 (2) European Law Review 
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oversteps its competence boundaries will depend on how genuine or negligible the 
impact of the legislation is on the internal market. The CJEU has been cautious 
identifying whether the EU legislature has manifestly acted beyond the limits of its 
discretion. It has stressed that Article 114 TFEU cannot be used if other legal bases 
are more appropriate. This was emphasised in the Waste Directive and in Waste 
Shipments cases, where the CJEU held that any effect of the measures in question to 
the internal market was ancillary.54 The CJEU decided that Article 191 TFEU was in 
these cases a more appropriate legal basis than Article 114 TFEU for the adoption of 
Directive 91/156 on waste and Regulation 259/93 on shipments of waste.55  This 
appears to be a preferable approach to overstretching Article 114 TFEU in order to 
bring national health care schemes within the scope of internal market regulation. 
Other fields of supporting competence pose less of a challenge to the exercise of 
national competence, but leave doubts about the effectiveness of EU action to 
coordinate Member States’ practices. For instance, the proliferation of legal 
instruments in the field of civil contingencies was not coupled with straightforward 
and binding commitments for the Member States. The new competence of civil 
protection under Article 196 TFEU provides that ‘the Union shall encourage 
cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of systems 
for preventing against natural or man-made disasters.’ Under Article 196 (2) TFEU, 
the European Parliament and the Council can establish supplementary measures to 
assist Member States achieving such objectives.56 The introduction of Article 196 
TFEU thus provides a lex specialis in the area of civil protection and therefore makes 
any future resort to lex generales unnecessary.57 Yet, the availability of a specific 
legal basis for civil protection does not necessarily produce more legal certainty viz. a 
more unified response to terrorist attacks for example. 
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Lisbon’s introduction of a ‘solidarity clause’ in Article 222 TFEU constitutes a 
further development in the field of EU civil protection aiming to address, inter alia, 
terrorist attacks. Article 222 TFEU states that the EU and its Member States ‘shall act 
jointly in a spirit of solidarity’ and mobilise all available instruments to assist a 
Member State (at its request) in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-
made disaster. In contrast with Article 214 TFEU (external emergencies which call 
for humanitarian aid and relief for third countries - victims of natural or man-made 
disasters), Article 222 TFEU is addressing internal emergencies. It is also broader in 
scope.58 
The Treaty of Lisbon thus contains significant changes regarding civil protection 
where, inter alia, the EU has been charged with the task of assisting in the preparation 
and promotion of swift effective cooperative action between national civil protection 
services and to promote consistency in international activities. In this context, Article 
222 TFEU would operate alongside Article 196 TFEU as a means of adopting civil 
protection legislation. The above combination of legal bases aside, civil protection 
does not allow for any drastic changes in the way the Member States conduct their 
policies. It rather constitutes a soft mutual commitment for non-conventional threats 
to the EU’s security and stability.59  
2.5 Separate Categories of Competence 
With reference to the coordination of economic and employment policies in Article 5 
TFEU, the CJEU has clarified that Member States ‘are entitled, in areas which do not 
fall under the exclusive competence of the Union, to entrust tasks to the institutions, 
outside the framework of the Union, such as the task of coordinating a collective 
action undertaken by the Member States or managing financial assistance.’60 It is, 
however, subject to speculation whether the current dispensation is practical provided 
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that economic and employment policies could have been assigned to one of the three 
mainstream categories of competence.  
We can start appreciating how difficult it is to pigeonhole these areas in any single 
category, especially when it comes to delicate political questions involving the EU’s 
permissible degree of oversight over the Member States’ economic policy and the 
promotion of a high level of employment as illustrated in Article 9 TFEU.  On the one 
hand, the streamlining of economic policies has implications for the EU’s exclusivity 
over the European Monetary Union (EMU) policy. It also raises questions about the 
EU or Member States’ liability for the debts of national governments of the Eurozone 
Member States (Article 125 TFEU). On the other hand, the modernisation and 
coordination of social protection systems lies within the policy mix of EU 
employment and social policies. Employment policy includes areas of shared 
competence such as working time, and health and safety (Article 153 TFEU), while 
social policy is a supporting competence under Article 156 TFEU, on the basis of 
which the EU Institutions can adopt soft measures on, inter alia, working conditions 
and social security. 
In relation to CFSP, building a new competence block constitutes a pragmatic 
decision to keep EU foreign policy separate (in the TEU) from the rest of EU law 
proper (in the TFEU). It is a political gesture to indirectly sustain the 
intergovernmental pillar system of the EU. The incentive to maintain a strong 
intergovernmental flavour within the EU’s external action is evident in Title V of the 
TEU which establishes in Article 24 (1) TEU that the CFSP is still governed by 
specific rules and procedures and is excluded from the TFEU list of EU competences. 
Yet, despite the preservation of the status quo, there are still elements of innovation in 
Lisbon’s CFSP provisions which prepare the ground for dangerous liaisons between 
the TEU and the TFEU. For instance, while the TEU retains the qualified majority 
exception in the CFSP, it embeds the decisions of the European Council on the so-
called EU strategic interests and objectives in a firm legal framework that allows for 
EU exercise of both CFSP and TFEU external competences.61 
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The above considerations are important when looking in detail at the Lisbon 
redrafting of Article 40 TEU which now protects the integrity of the CFSP from the 
TFEU as much as it protects the TFEU from possible encroachment by the CFSP.62 
This is a change of culture given the past express preference of former Article 47 
TEU (the predecessor to Article 40 TEU) to non-CFSP legal bases. Such a preference 
was endorsed by the CJEU in the relevant case law concerning the delimitation 
between non-CFSP and CFSP legal bases.63 By contrast, Lisbon’s Article 40 TEU 
constitutes a ‘mutual’ non-affectation clause which is valuable when a legal act 
touches upon both CFSP and non-CFSP fields.64 This is important because each field 
is characterised by its own unique procedures. For instance, in Parliament v Council, 
the CJEU held that a Regulation on ‘smart sanctions’ was rightly based on Article 215 
(2) TFEU, thereby rejecting the European Parliament’s argument that the measure 
ought to have been taken on the basis of Article 75 TFEU, which ensured a greater 
degree of parliamentary participation.65   
The current absence in Article 40 TEU of the past express preference to non-CFSP 
legal bases implies that European judges will now have the opportunity to adjudicate 
on whether an alleged TFEU act is in fact a CFSP act, and vice versa. The interaction 
between CFSP and TFEU competences under the Lisbon setting is deemed to attract 
considerable academic commentary vis-à-vis the arduous task that the CJEU has been 
charged with - i.e. guarding the boundaries between CFSP and TFEU by upholding 
what is now the ‘mutual’ non-affectation clause of Article 40 TEU. 
                                                          
62 See on the demarcation between CFSP and other EU external policies in light of Article 40 TEU: R. 
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63  See in this regard Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651; A. 
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3. Express Embodiments of Implied Competence  
As discussed, when the EU is provided with an objective to achieve under the Treaty, 
it is generally provided with a legal basis / express legal competence to adopt 
measures for this purpose. Such a legal basis provides the relevant enabling 
provisions that detail the type of measure that can be used and the process that must 
be followed which differs from one policy area to the next. As is known, whether by 
accident or design, the EU Institutions do not possess the express competence to 
legislate in every situation. The CJEU has provided that the EU may possess implied 
competence which can be inferred from its objectives. This section will discuss the 
concept of implied competence in EU law broadly defined in relation to EU activity 
taking place outside the strict bounds of the Treaty. There is both an internal and an 
external dimension to implied powers which provides the EU with a basis for powers 
where it may be necessary in order to supplement an express legal competence. In 
addition to implied powers as accepted by the CJEU, the Treaty has contained for a 
long time a petite révision clause in Article 352 TFEU employed by the EU 
Institutions in order to legislate in areas not yet covered by express legal provisions to 
meet the implied objectives of the Treaty. 66 
Internal implied powers are used in the absence of express powers in the Treaty in 
order to achieve an EU objective. For instance, the CJEU stressed that a Treaty 
provision conferring a specific task on the Commission powers may also confer 
powers which are ‘indispensable’ in order to carry out that specific task. 67 Although 
not revolutionary at first reading, the CJEU managed to convince Member States that 
EU Institutions have the implied competence to carry out tasks broadly related to 
specific tasks conferred upon them.  
Implied powers to carry out internal competences may also be used to support 
external powers, although no such external powers are provided in the Treaty. The 
CJEU has gone at great lengths to endorse the doctrine of implied powers in relation 
to EU external competences establishing that parallel powers exist in an area where 
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the EU already has competence to act. Put simply, an external implied power is an 
extension of an internal conferred power, so that the latter does not become nugatory. 
The doctrine of EU external implied powers was only recently codified in Article 3 
(2) and 216 TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty while internal implied powers remain 
uncodified.  
As mentioned, the Treaty also provides a residual power, which we will consider in 
this section not because it forms an ‘implied power’ strictu sensu but due to the fact 
that - as described by Engström - it is a provision that offers ‘an “intended” 
imposition of implied powers’. 68  We share this view here since the broad 
authorisation of Article 352 TFEU owes to the absence of an express Treaty 
competence and the ‘implied power’ derives from the need of the EU legislature to 
attain an EU objective. Comparing legislation based on the doctrine of implied 
powers as opposed to Article 352 TFEU, Engström notes that ‘parallelism entails 
deriving external powers from internal competence while Article 352 serves primarily 
to create internal competence.’69  
Indeed, the CJEU has developed the doctrine of external implied powers in a way that 
has kept it separate from the contours of Article 352 TFEU. For instance, in Opinion 
2/94, the CJEU was explicit that Article 352 TFEU is not part of the implied powers 
doctrine.70 Instead, the CJEU provided a narrow interpretation of Article 352 TFEU in 
order to avoid the undesired effect of submitting itself to the scrutiny of the ECHR as 
a distinct legal order with its own principles, judicial structure, and case-law. It 
affirmed its loyalty to the principle of conferral instead of making a declaration in line 
with the principle of implied powers, namely that the EU could reserve a broad 
competence in the area of fundamental rights. This is despite the fact that the 
Community had exclusive competence to conclude Protocol 12 of the ECHR on 
equality of all persons through the collective enforcement of a general prohibition of 
discrimination by means of the ECHR in order to attain the objectives of the two anti-
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 V. Engström, ‘Reasoning on Powers of Organisations’ in J. Klabbers, A. Wallendahl Research 
Handbook on the Law of International Organizations, p.63 onwards, p.63. 
69V. Engström, Constructing the Powers of International Institutions, Powers as a way of imaging 
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discrimination Directives adopted in 2000 under Article 13 EC (now Article 19 
TFEU).71 Such competence was never activated.  
We will hereafter discuss the two diverse provisions that encapsulate implied 
competences in EU law. On the one hand, the commonly-accepted doctrine of EU 
external implied competence now vested in Article 216 (1) TFEU which provides the 
EU legislature with a derivative external power to conclude international agreements. 
It is argued that its precise contours are still open to interpretation. On the other hand, 
Article 352 TFEU, an implied competence with a broad formulation, relates to the 
objectives of the EU in general and it currently serves primarily to create internal 
competences in a limited amount of cases. We consider them together because the 
effect of the exercise of either provisions is the expansion of EU competences beyond 
the strict margins of the Treaty. This is why they have been grouped as express 
embodiments of the implied competences doctrine for the purpose of this chapter. We 
will discuss them in chronological order – as mentioned, Article 216 (1) TFEU made 
its appearance at a much later stage in the evolution of EU law. 
3.1 The Flexibility Clause of Article 352 TFEU 
The flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU is a shared competence between the EU 
and the Member States which provides that the powers specifically allocated to the 
EU may not prove to be adequate for the purpose of attaining the objectives expressly 
set by the Treaties. It provides the EU with the option of extending its powers beyond 
those conferred by the Treaties. As such, it represents the most general power in the 
EU system of legislative competences. Its purpose is to enable the EU to react in 
unforeseen circumstances via the establishment of common EU policies. Therefore, 
whenever Article 352 TFEU is cited as the legal basis for a legislative proposal, it is 
common practice for Member States to check whether the proposal is necessary to 
attain one of the Treaty’s objectives and whether the Treaty has not provided the 
necessary power elsewhere. The pre-Lisbon version of the flexibility clause (Article 
308 EC) mentioned that it shall only be used in the course of the operation of the 
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common market.72 This is no longer the case, which, at least in theory, makes the 
scope of Article 352 TFEU applicable in other fields, such as external relations, and, 
therefore, much wider.  
Despite the widening of Article 352 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty has also added certain 
restrictions to it. Under Article 352 (2) TFEU, national parliaments shall ensure 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out 
in Protocol 12 of the Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Furthermore, under Article 352 (4) TFEU, the flexibility clause is 
inapplicable in the CFSP domain and any proposal citing it shall respect the limits of 
the above-mentioned non-affectation clause of Article 40 TEU. Additionally, Member 
States have unilaterally taken a stance against an unprecedented use of Article 352 
TFEU by introducing legislation which impacts on proposed legislation based on the 
flexibility clause. 
In the UK, the EU Act 2011 mandates that there is a requirement for Parliamentary 
approval in order to agree to any Treaty change, or the use of any passerelle or, in 
certain circumstances, recourse to Article 352 TFEU. In particular, section 8 of the 
EU Act 2011 appears controversial in that it requires parliamentary approval by an 
Act of Parliament before the UK can agree to any future use of Article 352 TFEU 
whether it is used as part of the legal base or exclusively for a proposed EU measure. 
Despite these parliamentary controls, recourse to Article 352 is not as frequent as it 
used to be. There are approximately thirteen legislative proposals since Lisbon of 
which just a fraction has come into force.73  
But why this change of circumstances? First, the former frequent use of the flexibility 
clause owed to the limited range of competences available in the Treaty.74 As already 
discussed, this position has changed. Second, since its inception the use of the 
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flexibility clause was inhibited not only by its residual nature (used only when the 
Treaty did not provide the necessary powers) but also by the requirement of 
unanimity voting in the Council. Third, as mentioned, the operational constraints to 
Article 352 TFEU are now watertight viz. subsidiarity checks and non-CFSP 
application. Fourth, the CJEU’s self-restraint in Opinions 1/94 and 2/94 as well as the 
powerful warnings issued by national courts and parliaments against an 
unprecedented use of EU residual competence have been influential on the future use 
of the flexibility clause.75  
The above variables aside, the fact that national governments are still alert about the 
flexibility clause reflects that the nature of Article 352 TFEU is still to some extent 
controversial. Perhaps this is because the flexibility provision is a constant reminder 
that the notion of the EU’s limited powers has been imperfect from its outset or 
perhaps only flawless when the EU institutions operate within the margins of the 
specific legal bases available in the TFEU. Thus, the controversy surrounding the 
advance of EU competence beyond conferral through resort to the flexibility clause is 
predominantly historical / cultural.76  
Indeed, Article 352 TFEU has informed a much smaller number of legislative 
proposals (about 3-4 per year). To provide some examples, Article 352 TFEU has 
been used for legislation to recognise electronic versions of the EU’s Official Journal 
as authentic and legally binding (Regulation); approving the framework of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency (Decision); a decision to give EU historical archives at 
the European University Institute in Florence (Regulation); and a decision to adopt a 
"Europe for Citizens” programme (Regulation).77 One can, therefore, arrive to the 
conclusion that the use of Article 352 TFEU has been downgraded and, therefore, 
currently used for rather trivial proposals.  
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Nonetheless, recent legislative proposals by the Commission have brought the 
policing of the use of the flexibility provision back to the fore. A look at 
Commission’s recent proposals, however, demonstrates that Article 352 TFEU can 
still be utilised to introduce a small number of far-reaching measures where there is 
political will. Yet, given the limitations of the flexibility clause such proposals can, at 
least in theory, be easily trumped by the Member States. Such proposals included a 
Directive on the placement on the market of food from animal clones. The proposal 
caused the reaction of the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons 
which argued that legislation on animal clones food amounted to ‘EU competence 
creep’ because action by the EU was not necessary in this area - its objective was not 
to protect animals but rather to address consumer perceptions of food derived from 
animal clones.78 The latter did not consist one of the objectives set out in the Treaties 
so as to legitimately trigger recourse to Article 352 TFEU. The Committee noted that, 
in any event, relying on Article 352 TFEU requires primary legislation pursuant to 
Section 8 of the EU Act 2011, and stressed that the Government had a veto over the 
adoption of the proposed Directive, which it had to exercise.  
Another controversial proposal concerned a Regulation about the exercise of the right 
to take collective action within the context of freedom of establishment and services 
(‘Monti II’ Regulation 2679/98). The proposal was based on Article 352 TFEU 
because of the lack of explicit provisions in the Treaty conferring the EU with 
necessary powers on the right to take collective action. However, legislation was 
halted by national parliaments which utilised the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure 
under Article 12 TEU and Protocol 2 attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The examples 
demonstrate that the Treaty is still a framework to be fleshed out and complemented 
but it has certain limitations - some of them imposed by EU law and others imposed 
by national law (especially the role of national parliaments). 
Given the safeguards written in respect to recourse to Article 352 TFEU, most of the 
problems related to its application appear to be internal and rather political. For 
instance, it has been argued that the UK government needs to find ways to police 
Article 352 TFEU requirements proactively and at an early stage in the legislative 
                                                          




process to avoid the risk of precedence setting and avoid any criticism about 
competence creep.79 On the same note, it should be acknowledged that the existence 
of safeguards (i.e. unanimity and an approval by an Act of Parliament under EU Act 
2011 in the UK) take place at a late stage in the legislative process. These safeguards 
neither remedy potential EU ‘competence creep’ nor do they relieve the governments 
of the Member States of their responsibility to scrutinise proposals early in the 
legislative process.80 
3.2 External Implied Competence under Article 216 (1) TFEU 
As discussed, the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the possibilities of resorting to Article 
352 TFEU by relaxing the historic link between the EU’s internal objectives and its 
external policies. Yet, although it has been established that Article 352 TFEU covers 
all areas of the EU’s activity (apart from CFSP), its inherent limitations make self-
conferral by the EU a difficult task. Declaration 42 explicitly mentions that Article 
352 TFEU cannot be used to evade the ordinary Treaty revision procedure under 
Article 48 TEU. Furthermore, a number of new leges speciales on external relations 
introduced in the Lisbon Treaty have made recourse to Article 352 TFEU harder. This 
is evident in the above-mentioned modest number of proposals under Article 352 
TFEU since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Notwithstanding this development, in the past 40 years or so, the CJEU has filled in 
the gaps of the EU constitutional framework in the external arena by developing its 
implied competence reasoning in numerous thematically diverse cases. These range 
from inter-institutional disputes (resolved through Article 263 TFEU) to CJEU 
opinions (delivered under Article 218 (11) TFEU) on EU competence to conclude 
international agreements in the fields of transport, safety in the workplace, 
commercial policy in respect of services, and the recognition of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters. The principles emanating from the CJEU’s voluminous and 
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sometimes complex case law are post-Lisbon somewhat condensed in Article 216 (1) 
TFEU.81 
Article 216 (1) TFEU constitutes a residual competence under which the EU may 
conclude an international agreement with one or more third countries or international 
organisations in the following three situations: first, where the Treaties so provide; 
second, where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within 
the framework of the EU’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties 
(also known as the principle of necessity); and third, where the conclusion of an 
agreement is provided for in a legally binding EU act or is likely to affect common 
rules or alter their scope. Once exercised, such power could become exclusive. Such 
exclusive implied external competence or derived exclusivity is now manifest in 
Article 3 (2) TFEU. Two key principles arising from the CJEU’s case law are 
important in the codification of the doctrine of implied powers: those of parallelism 
and necessity.  
 
As it is well-documented, the principle of parallelism stems from ERTA, an authority 
in the field of EU external relations law.82 The CJEU pointed out that the adoption of 
a common transport policy formed a Treaty objective and that common rules for its 
attainment had already been laid down by an EU Regulation. It was held, therefore, 
that the Treaty’s internal provisions (in foro interno) in the field of transport 
legitimised EU external action in the same field (in foro externo). Furthermore, 
Member States were pre-empted in ERTA from unilateral external action in the field 
of transport. The CJEU stressed that in the case at hand the conclusion of international 
agreements on road transport by Member States acting outside of the common 
institutions would not only jeopardise EU internal competences but would also be 
detrimental to the unity of the common market and the uniform application of EU 
law. With this in mind, the CJEU highlighted that the EU could enter into 
international agreements both by virtue of express conferment and by relying on other 
Treaty provisions and measures adopted by the EU legislature in the framework of 
those provisions.  
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In respect to the principle of parallelism, Article 216 (1) TFEU embraces the CJEU’s 
in foro interno - in foro externo motif and expands the ERTA effect even further. Its 
wording implies that international agreements can be based on either the list of EU 
objectives mentioned, for instance, in Article 3 TEU or a decision adopted in an area 
under the Treaties, such as Title V of the TFEU (AFSJ). On the one hand, this broad 
formulation confirms the elusiveness characterising the doctrine of implied powers as 
first established in ERTA. On the other hand, it keeps EU external action adaptable to 
changing needs. Furthermore, similar to ERTA, Article 216 (1) TFEU is in par with 
the doctrine of pre-emption, which constitutes the external axiom of the principle of 
EU law primacy. 
 
Not only did the ERTA parallelism dicta and its codification in the Lisbon Treaty 
render the doctrine of implied powers slippery. In addition, post-ERTA, the abstract 
test of necessity became increasingly important in establishing that recourse to an 
external competence is instrumental in achieving a Treaty objective. This means that 
the ERTA implied powers no more depend solely on the content and scope of EU 
primary law and existing secondary legislation. Instead, they are equally determined 
by the necessity of an effective use of the treaty-making power in each situation. In an 
attempt to capture the essence of the whole corpus of the CJEU’s case law on implied 
powers, Article 216 (1) TFEU confirms such a necessity-driven assessment of implied 
powers. 83  Nonetheless, necessity is too foggy a notion to justify any EU action 
because it links EU external competence with broad Treaty objectives rather than 
explicit internal legal bases. As a result, the constitutionalisation of necessity as a 
cause of recourse to external competence compromises the orthodoxy embedded in 
the principle of parallelism - i.e. that only the existence of an internal provision 
empowers the EU to act externally.  
 
When interpreting Article 216 (1) TFEU it is worth considering that the CJEU 
developed the doctrine of implied external powers due to the lack of express external 
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powers in the original Treaty of Rome (1957) which provided only for treaty-making 
powers in the context of the CCP and Association Agreements. In light of the 
proliferation of new competences in every Treaty revision, it can be argued that the 
Lisbon Treaty hardly lacks express provisions which could trigger the use of implied 
powers to achieve the EU’s external objectives. Since Article 216 (1) TFEU 
constitutes a general competence norm, the question turns on whether implied 
external powers are necessary anymore, considering that new express powers were 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
As mentioned above, specific legal bases now confer competences to the EU that 
relate explicitly to almost every field of external action. For instance, as established in 
Daiichi, the EU’s exclusive external competence for CCP covers the whole of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In contrast with the former situation where express external 
competences were scattered across the former EC Treaty, post-Lisbon, EU express 
external powers constitute Part Five of the TFEU. This Part includes fresh legal bases 
for areas ranging from humanitarian aid (Article 214 TFEU) to implementation of 
CFSP decisions on the imposition of economic sanctions or restrictive measures 
(Article 215 TFEU). This provision provides a means for implementing UN Security 
Council Resolutions. It also establishes a specific competence norm for the so-called 
‘smart sanctions’, so that reliance on the subsidiary competence under Article 352 
TFEU for their adoption is no more necessary.84  
 
There remain numerous policy areas where the ‘internal’ legal basis makes no 
reference to the possibility of the EU acting ‘externally’ by way of conclusion of 
international agreements. As a result, the EU may still act externally in certain areas 
by using the implied powers doctrine. It cannot, therefore, be argued with any 
certainty how frequent resort to implied powers will be in future. The revolving door 
will be there but simply would not be easily opened in light of the rich body of 
express legal competences in the field of external action written in the TFEU. 
Although it appears rare in the current setting that the EU will experience a shortage 
of express provisions which will allow it to conclude international agreements, there 
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is a possibility that the EU may wish to act externally in areas that the Treaty drafter 
did not foresee. Having said that, a specific legal basis would always be preferable. 
4. The balance of EU competences 
EU law owes its existence to a partial transfer of sovereignty by the Member States. 
Since the EU is a creation of the Member States, its competence ultimately derives 
from these states and is delegated to EU Institutions which should act as agents of the 
common interest. As a result, the ratification of the Treaties neither implies 
unconditional authority from the part of the EU nor a wholesale devaluation of 
national constitutionally entrenched rights. Equally, membership in the EU shall not 
entail a process of constant constitutional assessment of EU action stemming from 
domestic law to such a degree that the cohesion and unity of EU law would be put in 
jeopardy.  
Different conceptual frameworks have been employed to explain the nature of 
coordination and problem-solving at European level. Schütze’s cooperative 
federalism model, for instance, embraces the notion that shared competence is the 
norm the EU is based upon a compromise between maximalism and minimalism: a 
majority-rule federal system where national governments and supranational 
institutions engage to advanced cooperation and joint problem-solving exercises. 
Such a decentralised model is predicated on the maxim that Member States remain the 
Masters of the Treaties.85   
At the same time though, we shall appreciate that ultimate decision-making does not 
rest upon national governments but upon the supranational institutions entrusted by 
the Member States to act as their agents.86 Frequently these agents push their own 
agenda, inclusive of the objective of ‘an ever closer union’, a term currently resisted 
by the UK. Hence, it is not accidental that respect to national constitutional traditions 
and identities (as it is recently the trend in the case law)87 is back to the fore of the EU 
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future debate. Constitutional courts, such as the BVerfG, seem to be playing their last 
trump card by making references to the CJEU almost prescribing the outcome of its 
decisions.88 Of course, CJEU decisions such as the OMT and Melloni illustrate that 
national peculiarities sit uncomfortably next to the requirement of uniformity as a 
necessary component of the EU legal order.89 By prescribing the permissible degree 
of deviation from EU law, the CJEU also protects the constitutional texts of the 
majority of its Member States who may be indirectly compromised by the higher 
threshold of protection mandated by the constitution of a particular Member State. 
Notwithstanding its resistance to downplay the relevance of all 28 constitutions for 
European integration, it cannot be denied that the CJEU’s jurisprudence still relies 
heavily on the effect utile doctrine. It is thus, often inconsistent with historical 
precedent. Amongst other decisions, in Daiichi the CJEU deviated from its previous 
findings in Opinion 1/76 by establishing EU competence to interpret external patent 
law (i.e. TRIPS) while simultaneously providing for internal competence to approve 
internal patent law. Moreover, the Luxembourg judges’ effectiveness-laden approach 
also empowers the CJEU to deliver preliminary rulings even in situations where the 
matter in the case at hand falls outside the scope of EU law (in internal situations). 
Instead of determining its jurisdiction according to EU express competences, the 
CJEU prioritises the broader EU interest in order to forestall future differences of 
interpretation. Its set precedent suggests that ‘provisions or concepts taken from EU 
law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they 
are to apply.’90  
Furthermore, the CJEU’s pro-integrationist stance allows it to acquiescence to a top-
down preemptive approach. In this regard, the duty of loyalty is a useful mechanism 
to reverse the roles initially attributed to the Member States and the EU - it is the 
Member States that have a duty of agency or abstention even where the competence at 
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issue is neither exclusive ab initio nor pre-emptive through the application of the 
CJEU’s established case law.91 This is particularly the case recently in the field of EU 
external competence clearly illustrated by the OIV case and Opinion 1/13 of the 
CJEU. 92  Both cases confirm the CJEU’s unconcealed interference with national 
competence. In particular, the CJEU appears unprepared and unwilling to recognise 
the implications of EU Member States’ membership in other international 
organisations which, similar to the EU, prescribe obligations and commitments for 
states and their governments.  
Such an extensive interpretation of EU competences by the CJEU has boosted the 
claim of the EU as an independent legal order by externalising its norms to third 
actors using the maxim: in foro interno / in foro externo. Consequently, the CJEU has 
invoked EU fundamental values such as the autonomy of EU law and fundamental 
rights in order to escape unsettling international obligations.93 Despite these external 
developments, it can be claimed that the EU is yet to set its house in order internally. 
Inter alia, the issue of democratic legitimacy is still sensitive while the public is shut 
out from EU decision-making. The Euro and migration crises have worsened the 
problem. Hence, the legislative conferral of new competences to the EU and the broad 
interpretation of existing ones by the CJEU remain key areas of concern and have in 
turn posed questions concerning the future level of diffusion of state authority to the 
EU. 
Last but not least, the CJEU has employed fundamental rights protection as a barrier 
to national competence. It has stated that its established case law concerning the scope 
of the general principles of EU law also applies to the EU Charter of Fundamental 
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Rights (the Charter) as an instrument of justice binding upon the Member States.94 
Thus, for instance, since asylum policy (which falls under the AFSJ) is a shared 
competence, Article 18 of the Charter provides a roadmap for strengthening the rights 
and protection pertaining to asylum. It guarantees that the right to asylum applies in 
all fields of action of both the EU and the Member States that fall widely within its 
scope of application of EU law.  
The CJEU has also entertained the possibility of applying the Charter outside the 
Treaty’s prescribed list of EU competences. For instance, in Åkerberg Fransson the 
CJEU applied the Charter against the imposition of administrative fines and criminal 
penalties related to tax fraud.95 The competence hook there was the EU’s power to 
harmonise VAT - hence Sweden had to observe the Charter when exercising its own 
competence (i.e. imposing penalties) while giving effect to the ‘VAT Directive’ 
(89/666). 96  Very skilfully, the CJEU established a parallel between the 
‘implementation’ of EU law (where the Charter indeed applies under Article 51 (1) 
CFR) with the national circumstances that fell within the ‘scope of application’ of EU 
law (where the Charter did not technically apply).97  
The judicial contribution to the expansion of EU competence indeed forms an important 
component in the delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States. 
Historically, the CJEU has given an expansive interpretation to the right to free 
movement albeit whether this concerns goods (mutual recognition), persons (direct 
effect of Article 21 TFEU in relation to EU citizenship) or services (the infamous 
‘medical tourism’ cases). Yet, two factors have reduced the CJEU’s velocity: The first is 
the codification of judicial precedent into legislation. The development of mutual 
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recognition in measures on the freedom to provide services and criminal law does not 
need an introduction. The second is the CJEU’s own exercise of self-restraint with 
regard to its previous blanket application of EU fundamental freedoms, most recently 
concerning the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States. This 
right has been balanced with ongoing concerns in the Member States related to the 
maintenance of financial equilibrium of the national social security systems.98  
The recent CJEU decisions in Dano and Alimanovic appear receptive to national 
concerns related to free movement of persons who constitute an economic burden on 
Member States. First, in Dano, the CJEU stressed that Member States may exclude from 
entitlement to social assistance EU citizens who arrive in their territory without 
intending to find a job. Subsequently, in Alimanovic, the CJEU held that EU citizens 
who travel to a Member State of which they are not nationals in order to seek 
employment may be excluded from entitlement to certain social benefits. This apparent 
trend seems to be in synch with most Member States’ view on the matter of free 
movement and how it impinges upon access to social benefits.99  
Apart from the CJEU’s interpretation, there are three additional variables touched upon 
in this chapter.100 These are the political choice of the Member States to transfer more 
competences to the EU through Treaty amendment; the capacity of the EU Institutions to 
incrementally pass EU legislation and, last, the Member States governments’ acceptance 
of voluminous EU legislation. The latter is of course contingent upon the government 
that is in power at a given time when such acceptance occurs. For instance, in Sweden, 
the implementation of the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) adopted in 2006 was 
delayed due to fundamental rights concerns. Sweden, which was initially in favour of 
Data Retention legislation, had a change of government in 2006 - and as it seems a 
change of plan - which resulted in minimal implementation of the Directive. The 
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consequence of this was that in 2010, the Commission started infringement proceedings 
against Sweden and held that the government had failed to fulfill its obligations under 
the Directive.101   
Notwithstanding the importance of all the above-mentioned variables pertaining to EU 
competence delimitation, the prevailing concern about the scope of EU competence has 
at times produced inaccurate fables in the Member States about how, for instance, EU 
Institutions can deploy their legislative competence. For instance, the residual 
competence of Article 352 TFEU, the most general of all legal bases in the Treaty, has 
been considered as carrying the potential of devaluing the principle of conferral due to 
its functional breadth. Indeed, ten years ago Weatherill was right to warn that Article 352 
TFEU together with Article 114 TFEU were ‘properly implicated by the Laeken 
Declaration in the crime of competence creep’.102 However, things have changed in the 
last 10 years. While Article 114 TFEU retains its strength, Article 352 TFEU has 
atrophied considerably due to the availability of new specific legal bases that enable the 
EU’s objectives to be given effect. In any case, the fact that the Treaty’s flexibility 
clause has always been constrained by unanimity voting in the Council reinforces the 
argument that often creeping occurred with the national governments’ consent.  
All in all, the development of EU competence as a legal device includes a host of 
integration milestones achieved through common action by the Member States. 
Hence, as far as Member States are concerned, the growth of EU competence is often 
self-inflicted. Probably this explains why overall the EU has positioned itself 
relatively succinctly within the plurality of constitutional systems that compose it. 
Indeed, the notion of state sovereignty is unsustainable in normative terms given the 
systematic expansion of EU competence in recent years. Additionally, the EU has 
incrementally built a strong external profile which results in more competence 
conferral in order to represent Member States externally and conclude international 
agreements on their behalf.103  
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5. Concluding remarks – the future 
This chapter provided an overview of EU competences, mapping their delimitation 
through the Treaty’s typology. Overall, it painted a positive picture of the current 
scheme of competence allocation, providing examples where attention is needed. The 
debate on competence delimitation both pre- and post-Lisbon has cohered around the 
clarification of the scope of existing powers, rather than traversing new boundaries 
with a view to limit the ability of the EU to respond promptly to new challenges. This 
is despite the (political) trend/narrative, evident in a minority of Member States, 
favouring repatriation of powers from the EU. For instance, prior to ‘Brexit’, 
renegotiation or repatriation of powers was presented across a raft of policy areas by 
the British Government despite the overall positive outcome of its preceding balance 
of competence review.104 The UK’s perceived success at renegotiating the terms of its 
membership was considered key to the Government’s subsequent support for the 
remain option in the EU referendum that took place on 23 June 2016. 
The preceding analysis on the legal and political reality of EU competence reveals 
that the EU enjoys a range of competences which differ in nature according to their 
category (whether exclusive, shared, supporting) and according to sectoral areas 
within those categories. The EU still operates under the maxim that the Treaty cannot 
confer new powers or functions on the EU institutions, even if those functions are 
exercised outside the Treaty. Yet, certain issues remain to be clarified beyond the 
traditional dividing lines pertaining to the division of competence between the EU and 
the Member States examined in this contribution (i.e. inclusive of the Member States’ 
gradual transfer of competences to the EU; the EU Institutions’ regulatory powers; 
and the CJEU’s teleological approach).  
For example, policy responses to the financial crisis have tested the limitations of the 
current Treaty framework to the extent that we have witnessed intergovernmental 
agreements concluded outside the confines of the Treaties. Such a plurilateral 
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arrangement was evidenced in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, 
a response to the financial crisis, where EU institutions chose to deploy their 
competences outside the boundaries of EU law.105 Whether this effort points to a 
trend of renationalisation of particular EU competences remains to be seen, although 
this chapter argues that clarification is more desirable and more practical. In 
particular, a preference is drawn towards the option of having a clear-cut delimitation 
where possible, a borderline clarification where a precise competence division is 
impractical, and effective judicial monitoring by the CJEU in both cases.  
Although, as argued above, the current competence dispensation is overall useful to 
retain, one cannot oversee the rise of differentiation as an alternative form of action 
by a group of Member States. Differentiation has been manifested in three ways – two 
of those contain competence-enhancing features whilst one is competence-restrictive 
in nature. First, Member States have established alternative legal orders outside the 
EU like the abovementioned Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.106 
Second, in recent years the option of variable geometry has become a central feature 
of EU competence. This is because this method, given legal armour by the Treaty’s 
provisions on enhanced and structured cooperation, allows pace-setter states to carve 
new areas of EU activity that may have a spill-over effect upon traditional areas of 
EU competence. Third, differentiation can take shape as pure unilateralism aiming at 
repatriating powers back to the Member States. The current renegotiation and 
prospective EU referendum in the UK forms such an example.  
We are yet to see how such purely unilateral initiatives are going to play out as 
constraints to EU competences and as ways of involving the electorates to decide on 
complex matters such as the necessity of supranational legislation in highly technical 
areas.107 Whatever the case may be, Commission President Junker confirmed that 
‘eventually, it will no longer be possible that 33, 34 or 35 states will proceed with the 
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same speed and the same momentum in the same direction…’108 Junker’s remark 
demonstrates that differentiation, in whatever form it manifests itself, will feature 
heavily in the competence debate. It remains to be seen whether it will destabilise the 
EU as a system of governance based on one-speed ‘Communitarian’ cooperation / 
integration. 
Some of the competence concerns of the Member States illustrated in this chapter are 
indeed well-grounded. On the one hand, the conferral of new competences from the 
Member States to the EU is incremental beyond doubt – yet EU integration seems to 
lack a clear narrative dimension. On the other hand, the CJEU’s role in the broad 
interpretation accorded to Treaty provisions, especially in cases described by the 
Member States as purely internal situations can be off-putting. The CJEU is, however, 
the end user when it comes to deciding about EU competence stretches in the relevant 
litigation. The examples provided in this chapter illustrate that the story of EU 
competence – a story bearing the marks of ‘division’ or ‘delimitation’ is strongly 
linked to national priorities driving the maturity of the EU as a multi-level political 
system, a diplomatic actor, a conflict manager, a security provider and a global 
promoter of values. 
Indeed, the EU has transformed from a constitutional actor and regulator (in the areas 
where Member States have commonly agreed that this should be the case) to a 
disciplinarian and a global player. As such, judicial supervision, input legitimacy and 
the safeguarding of EU constitutional values (such as democracy and the rule of law 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU) have gained political impetus in the Member States. The 
prevailing argument is that the EU is perceived as an autonomous legal order distinct 
from other international organisations, and hence on this basis it must take 
responsibility and subject its norms to judicial review.109 Accountability is crucial in 
order to correct systemic threats to the rule of law arising, for instance, from the EU’s 
external action. Indeed, the EU’s emerging global profile is a good example of how 
the Treaty’s competence goalposts have shifted considerably since the Maastricht 
Treaty which formally extended the EU’s competence to foreign policy.  
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The EU has indeed marked its territory as a contributor to global regulatory standards 
in areas such as foreign direct investment (draft free trade agreement with 
Singapore);110 emissions trading111 and international trade (Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership with the US). 112  The current richness of EU activity is 
sanctioned by the current competence dispensation which reflects the interest of the 
Member States to move further down the integration path. The flexibility surrounding 
the current delimitation rules encourages the EU Institutions to transverse literal 
interpretations of EU competence, marking, therefore, the occasional sea change in 
the sovereign practices of the Member States and ultimately the EU’s overall 
regulatory presence.  
There is certainly scope for a more rigid distribution of powers at EU level inclusive 
of a further attempt to draw procedural dividing lines and avoid overlaps. This can be 
obtained in the future through Treaty change. The meticulous exercise construing a 
new Treaty would take time and effort to negotiate and agree upon its final text. 
Whilst the timeframe of a Treaty revision is uncertain, the EU is bound to witness 
sporadic calls for sectoral changes uprooting in integration-sceptic Member States. In 
some cases, such changes would be welcome and thus introduced via treaty 
amendment in accordance with Article 48 TFEU (i.e. in par with the constitutional 
requirements of the Member States) or sectoral secondary legislation. In other cases, 
proposals for drastic changes may jeopardise the unity of the EU and, thus, may not 
be possible. Such situations may rarely result in national executives campaigning for 
extreme solutions, inclusive of withdrawal from the EU under the Article 50 TEU 
procedure.113 
Positioning ourselves in the competence debate, we shall be vigilant not to neglect the 
fact that the EU with all its complexity is a pluralist entity that focuses on collective 
gains. On one hand, the conception that there is too much EU integration can hardly 
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be a justification to rebuild the current system of competence delimitation. On the 
other hand, to admit that there is an existential problem at the core of EU competence 
delimitation will require all Member States to do something about it. As things 
currently stand, the majority of national executives have neither expressed the urge 
nor do they possess the will power to break away from the existing imperfect but, 
nonetheless, functioning system of EU competence delimitation. To a large extent the 
collective mood about the division of competences in EU law can be summarised in a 
cosmopolitan federalist variation of an old maxim: ‘if it’s only broken according to 
one or two Member States, don’t fix it’. The role of the counterfactual is bound to 
remain key in measuring the future competences of the Union and their effect on the 
Member States.  
